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The development of the EU asylum
policy: venue-shopping in perspective
Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard
ABSTRACT The development of the EU asylum and migration policy is often
explained as the result of ‘venue-shopping’, that is, the move by policy-makers to
an EU policy venue in order to avoid national constraints. This article demonstrates
that, contrary to what would have been expected on the basis of this widespread view,
EU co-operation on asylum matters has actually led to a rise in the legal standards
applicable to asylum-seekers and refugees. This outcome can be mainly explained
by broader changes that have gradually affected the EU ‘system of venues’ and
have thereby decreased the likelihood of more restrictive measures being adopted
in the EU asylum policy venue. This has important implications for the EU govern-
ance of asylum and migration in general.
KEY WORDS Communitarization; EU asylum policy; judicialization; Lisbon
Treaty; system of venues; venue-shopping.
INTRODUCTION
European Union (EU) co-operation on asylum has significantly grown in recent
years, making this policy area one of the most dynamic in the EU (Ferguson
Sidorenko 2007; Kaunert 2009, 2010; Peers and Rogers 2006). Many scholars
have argued that the ‘EU asylum and migration policy’ has been mostly restric-
tive and has generally aimed to reduce the numbers of migrants and asylum-
seekers coming to Europe (Guild 2003, 2004, 2006a; Levy 2005). One of
the main explanations for this increasing co-operation on asylum and migration
at the EU level is that member states have decided to ‘venue-shop’. According to
this argument, first made by Guiraudon (2000, 2003), national policy-makers
in the field of asylum and migration moved policy-making on these matters to a
new EU ‘policy venue’, in a bid to circumvent the liberal pressures and obstacles
that they faced at the domestic level.
This article aims to revisit this argument in relation to the EU asylum policy
specifically. More than 10 years have elapsed since the publication of Guirau-
don’s (2000) seminal article, during which the EU asylum policy has signifi-
cantly developed as various financial and legislative instruments have been
adopted (Kaunert and Léonard 2011). What has happened to asylum policy
since the venue-shopping to the EU level? It is necessary to address this question
because of the prominence of ‘venue-shopping’ as an explanation for the
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development of the EU asylum policy and the fact that there have been impor-
tant changes since the argument was originally made by Guiraudon in 2000.
Not only has EU co-operation on asylum considerably developed, but the
EU itself has also considerably changed, as it has seen the adoption of new trea-
ties amending its institutional framework and decision-making processes, the
latest of which is the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force on 1 December
2009. This article therefore aims to answer the following twin questions: to
what extent has ‘venue-shopping’ to the EU level led, or not, to the adoption
of more restrictive asylum provisions, and how can one explain this outcome?
The article begins by presenting the concept of venue-shopping and its appli-
cation to the development of EU co-operation on asylum and migration
matters. It then revisits the venue-shopping framework and outlines four
amendments to it in order to increase its explanatory power. The following
section examines the key outputs of the EU asylum policy to date. It shows
that, overall, the switch to an EU venue for asylum policy-making has not led
to the adoption of more restrictive asylum provisions. The following section
argues that this outcome has been mainly a result of the significant changes
that have affected the EU ‘system of venues’ as a whole, and, in turn, the EU
asylum policy venue by making it more liberal and therefore less prone to the
adoption of more restrictive asylum measures.
VENUE-SHOPPING IN THE EU ASYLUM AND MIGRATION
POLICY: TOWARDS A NEW VENUE-SHOPPING FRAMEWORK
Drawing upon the literature on ‘policy venues’ developed by Baumgartner and
Jones (2009), Guiraudon (2000) has suggested that a ‘venue-shopping’ frame-
work is the most adequate to account for the timing of the creation, the form
and the content of EU co-operation on asylum and migration matters.
‘Venue-shopping’ refers to the idea that policy-makers, when encountering
obstacles in their traditional policy venue, tend to seek new venues for policy-
making that are more amenable to their preferences and goals. Thus, Guiraudon
has argued that national officials began to co-operate on asylum and migration
matters at the European level after encountering domestic obstacles when
attempting to develop increased migration controls at the beginning of the
1980s (Guiraudon 2000: 252). These obstacles notably comprised judicial con-
straints, the activities of pro-migrant groups and the necessity for Interior min-
istries to compromise with other ministries (e.g., Labour, Social Affairs) when
making national legislation (Guiraudon 2000; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006;
see also Freeman 1995, 2006; Joppke 1998, 2001; Joppke and Marzal 2004).
In particular, attempts to further increase migration controls in several Euro-
pean countries were stifled, Guiraudon argues, by the jurisprudence of higher
courts – what has come to be known as the ‘judicialization’ of asylum and
migration policies (Gibney 2001).
According to Guiraudon (2000), venue-shopping to the EU level enabled
policy-makers aiming to increase migration controls to attain their objectives
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by avoiding the aforementioned obstacles. First of all, venue-shopping allowed
policy-makers to avoid judicial constraints, as the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) had no competence to adjudicate on asylum and migration matters
under the Maastricht Treaty and was only given limited competences in this
policy area by the Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, venue-shopping allowed
Interior ministries to largely exclude possible ‘enemies’ from the decision-
making process by considerably restricting the roles of the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the ECJ, which were seen as
more ‘migrant-friendly’. The creation of a separate Third Pillar, notably com-
prising asylum and migration, also led to a decoupling of these issues from
other related issues such as employment and social affairs, which were dealt
with by other parts of the European Commission. In addition, the switch to
the EU policy venue made it more difficult for non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to monitor policy-making on asylum and migration, as they had been
hitherto organized primarily at the national level.
To date, there have been two main attempts to build upon Guiraudon’s
‘venue-shopping’ framework to understand the development of the EU
asylum and migration policy. First of all, Lavenex (2006) has highlighted a
new pattern of ‘venue-shopping’ by identifying an ‘outward’ shift – in contrast
with the previous ‘upward’ shift – of policy-making on migration towards the
realm of EU foreign policy. Maurer and Parkes also engaged with Guiraudon’s
framework to argue that the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty did not
lead to any shift away from what they call the ‘previous security- and control-
orientation of asylum policy’ (2007: 173). Thus, the literature on venue-shop-
ping in the field of asylum and migration argues that national policy-makers
have decided to ‘venue-shop’ to the EU level mainly as an attempt to avoid
national obstacles to the development of more restrictive asylum and migration
policies.
Revisiting the venue-shopping framework
It is argued here that four changes to the venue-shopping framework initially
used by Guiraudon are necessary. First of all, it is suggested analytically breaking
down the ‘EU asylum and migration’ policy venue considered by Guiraudon
and Lavenex into three distinct venues that concern asylum, external borders
and migration respectively. Albeit closely related, these are distinct policy
issues with different legislative provisions and different policy goals attached.
The EU defines the goal of its ‘common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection
and temporary protection’ as ‘offering appropriate status to any third-country
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement’, whereas the goal of the EU’s ‘common immigra-
tion policy’ is defined as ‘ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of
migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in
member states, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat,
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings’ (Articles 78 and 79 of
1398 Journal of European Public Policy
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]). With regard to
external borders, the EU aims to gradually introduce an integrated management
system for external borders with a view to ensuring a high and uniform level of
control of persons and surveillance at the external borders (Article 77 TFEU).
Distinguishing between the three policy venues allows for a more precise analy-
sis of their development, including the possibility of identifying the existence of
different – and even potentially diametrically opposed – trends. It would then
become possible to observe, for example, the co-existence of a liberal trend in the
EU asylum policy venue, whereby higher standards are adopted for refugees and
asylum-seekers, and restrictive tendencies in the EU migration and border
policy venues, which have a negative impact on migrants and those who are
potential (rather than actual) asylum-seekers. Secondly, this article suggests
that an analytical framework based on policy venues can be enhanced by
acknowledging that some policy venues partially depend on one another and
can therefore be termed ‘co-dependent’ venues. In other words, there are
some policy venues that have indirect effects on other, related venues (‘co-
dependency effects’), although it is possible and sometimes even beneficial to
analytically distinguish between them. For example, in the EU, the asylum
policy venue is partially dependent on the external borders venue, as the
measures adopted in the latter have an impact on those developed in the
former. However, space constraints prevent the full empirical application of
this idea in the present article, which is pursued elsewhere.
Thirdly, this article argues that it is important to analyse any policy venue in
the broader context of the ‘system of policy venues’ to which it belongs. This
idea was already put forward by Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 216), who
have developed their framework with reference to the United States federal
system. Of particular interest to the present analysis is their observation that
‘[while] the various parts of the federal system differ from each other in a
number of ways, they are also part of a whole. As parts of a single system,
they can all simultaneously be affected by changes in the structure of the
federal system itself.’ Such institutional changes can, in turn, cause ‘dramatic
changes in the behaviors’ of the actors concerned over time (Baumgartner
and Jones 2009: 216). Adapted to the EU political system, this refers to the
idea that policy venues, such as the EU asylum policy venue, may be affected
by constitutional-level changes that remodel the whole EU institutional
setting. As a consequence of treaty changes, such as the Lisbon Treaty, new pol-
itical actors with their own preferences may have entered new venues (such as
the EU asylum policy venue) and the preferences of the actors already present
in these venues may have changed as a result of EU co-operation, as further
explained below. Overall, such changes are likely to have had an impact on
the policies subsequently adopted in the policy venue.
Finally, this article also suggests adopting another approach to member state
preferences. Guiraudon’s analysis in 2000 was premised on the idea that EU
member states seek to pursue restrictive asylum and migration policies. This
could be seen as an over-simplification to assume that all member states
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(which now amount to 27, soon to be 28) would share the same preference for
restrictive asylum and migration policies and that this would remain constant
over time. The latter is particularly questionable given that EU member states
are engaged in a process of increasingly closer co-operation on asylum and
migration matters. In the international system, national interests are, already,
partly the result of international co-operation (Katzenstein 1996). Thus,
although some scholars such as Moravcsik (1998) have put forward a different
view, it is argued here that, in line with the works of scholars such as Haas
(1958) and Sandholz (1993), preference formation should be seen as endogen-
ous of institutionalized co-operation, i.e., partly resulting from the co-operation
itself. In practice, this means that the preferences of the member states over
asylum may evolve at least partially over time as a result of co-operating in
the EU institutional context. This highlights that, for any actor seeking to use
venue-shopping strategically, there is actually a risk attached to venue-shopping,
as it may have unanticipated consequences, such as changes in the preferences of
the actors involved or the appearance of new actors in the new venue with differ-
ent preferences.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU ASYLUM POLICY
This section aims to analyse whether the switch to the EU asylum policy venue
has indeed led to the adoption of more restrictive legal provisions on asylum, as
one would expect on the basis of the venue-shopping framework. In line with
the amendments to the framework previously proposed, this section focuses
on the EU asylum policy venue by separating it from the borders and migration
venues. However, a few definitions and clarifications are required before pro-
ceeding to the empirical analysis of the main policy developments in the EU
asylum venue. ‘More restrictive provisions on asylum’ are defined in this
article as ‘provisions that decrease the rights and entitlements of asylum-
seekers, the range of grounds on which asylum can be claimed, or the equity
of asylum procedures’. In contrast, provisions that increase the rights of
actual asylum-seekers are termed ‘liberal’ provisions (Hansen and King 2000;
Lavenex 2001). In that respect, it is important to also underline that, as we
are only concerned with the asylum policy venue in this article, we do not
assess whether more or less potential asylum-seekers have been able to physically
reach the EU and then apply for asylum. According to our analytical framework,
this would amount to an assessment of the co-dependency effects of the EU
borders policy venue on the EU asylum policy venue. This is an important
topic, but it falls outside the scope of this article because of space restrictions.
As for ‘policy venues’, they are understood by Baumgartner and Jones (2009:
31) as the ‘institutions or groups in society [that] have the authority to make
decisions concerning [an] issue’. Adapted to the EU, where legal rules are of
paramount importance, a policy venue is defined for the purpose of this
article as the ‘institutional and legal arrangements governing the pursuit of a
given policy goal’. As mentioned before, the EU defines the goal of its
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‘common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection’ as
‘offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring inter-
national protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement’ (Article 78 TFEU). Thus, the ‘EU asylum policy venue’ refers to
the institutional and legal arrangements governing the pursuit of the aforemen-
tioned goal. The inclusion of ‘legal arrangements’ in the definition is necessary
to highlight that, in the EU, it is not only the question of ‘who decides’ that
matters, but also how decisions are made (i.e., according to which legal arrange-
ments regarding the decision-making process).
This section examines the main asylum instruments adopted by the EU in
order to assess whether upward venue-shopping, that is, the development of
co-operation amongst member states in the EU institutional setting, has led
to the adoption of more restrictive asylum provisions as one would expect on
the basis of Guiraudon’s (2000) seminal article. All the legal instruments con-
sidered here were adopted after 1999, once the EU was allowed the use of
more effective instruments than the ‘soft law’ measures and conventions of
the Maastricht era, which, overall, had only a limited impact (Geddes 2008).
To date, the EU’s main achievements in the area of asylum comprise the
adoption of four key directives – the so-called ‘Temporary Protection’, ‘Quali-
fication’, ‘Procedures’, and ‘Reception Conditions’ Directives – and the
‘Dublin II Regulation’, as well as the decision to establish a European
Asylum Support Office in 2010. These four directives establish common
minimum standards with regard to various aspects of national asylum
systems, whilst the ‘Dublin II Regulation’ establishes the criteria and mechan-
isms for determining the member state responsible for examining a given
asylum application lodged in one of the member states by a third-country
national (see Kaunert and Léonard 2011). The Temporary Protection Directive
lays down provisions on temporary protection for displaced persons in the
context of a mass influx of persons seeking protection. The Reception Con-
ditions Directive sets minimum standards for various aspects of the reception
of asylum-seekers in the EU member states, including information, residence
and freedom of movement, employment, education and vocational training,
material reception conditions, and health care. The Qualification Directive
lays down minimum standards for the qualification of third-country nationals
or stateless persons as refugees or as subsidiary protection beneficiaries and
elaborates upon the status associated with each of these categories. The
Asylum Procedures Directive provides for several minimum procedural stan-
dards regarding issues such as access to the asylum procedure, the right to
remain in the member state pending the examination of the application, guar-
antees and obligations for asylum-seekers, personal interviews, legal assistance
and representation, detention, and appeals. Although some aspects of each of
these instruments may be – and have been – criticized, it cannot be argued
that, overall, they have enacted more restrictive asylum legal standards. On
the contrary, EU co-operation on asylum matters has actually led, overall, to
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an increase in legal protection standards across the EU. This is demonstrated in
the remainder of this section.
First of all, it is important to emphasize that the four asylum directives only
lay down minimum standards, which can be exceeded by individual member
states. They do not oblige member states to decrease more generous standards
in any way. However, they do curtail any potential ‘race to the bottom’
amongst member states to a significant extent by setting minimum standards
from which they cannot derogate. Secondly, contrary to some predictions,
there has not been any evidence that member states have generally used the
adoption of the four directives as an opportunity to lower their asylum standards
to the level of the minimum standards. Some observers had initially expressed
the concern that member states having more generous provisions would natu-
rally feel compelled to make them more restrictive in order to render themselves
‘less attractive’ to asylum-seekers (see, for example, Garlick 2006: 47). However,
there is no conclusive evidence that this predicted degradation of the asylum
standards has taken place in practice (El-Enany and Thielemann 2011; Hail-
bronner 2008). This prediction appears to have been based on the assumption
that member states with more generous provisions were only waiting for a ‘good
excuse’ to decrease their protection standards. However, different national
asylum standards reflect ‘different experiences, traditions and social and geo-
graphical conditions’ (Hailbronner 2009: 2). It is therefore unlikely that
those EU member states that have over time adopted relatively more generous
asylum provisions for various reasons would necessarily be driven to drastically
alter them by the EU’s setting of common minimum standards. Far from using
EU instruments as an excuse to decrease their asylum standards, EU member
states have generally proved reluctant to alter their domestic asylum provisions,
in line with the argument by Börzel (2003) that member states tend to favour
the adoption of EU provisions that are most akin to those already in place at
the national level.
Thirdly, not only have the EU asylum provisions not caused an overall drop in
legal protection standards across the EU, but they have actually raised legal stan-
dards in several respects (Kaunert 2009, 2010; Levy 2010). In particular, the
Qualification Directive has significantly increased protection standards in the
EU (Ferguson Sidorenko 2007: 217). It has codified a ‘subsidiary protection’
status, which is an improvement on the often ad hoc and discretionary character
of complementary protection measures that were in existence in several EU
member states (McAdam 2005), in addition to extending the scope of ‘actors
of persecution or serious harm’ to non-state actors. These important provisions
have had a profound impact on the legislation and practices in several EU
member states, including France and Germany, which have been required to
introduce new grounds for protection in their national legislation (El-Enany
and Thielemann 2011: 106–7). The Temporary Protection Directive has
also been seen as facilitating the provision of international protection to
persons requiring it in situations of ‘mass influx’ (Garlick 2006). It is true
that the other EU asylum instruments have not been so favourably received
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(Guild 2004, 2006a). The Asylum Procedures Directive has been particularly
criticized (Costello 2005). However, it is important to note that its minimum
procedural standards have actually required several EU member states to raise
their protection standards (Ackers 2005: 32; Fullerton 2005;), whilst some of
its most controversial provisions were annulled by the ECJ in 2008 (Kaunert
and Léonard 2011: 87). This assessment is also shared by El-Enany (2008:
334) who argues that ‘[in] a number of ways, the European refugee is better
treated than ever before; guaranteed broader and more equitable protection in
each Member State’.
Fourthly, it is important to emphasize that these higher asylum standards do
not ‘only exist on paper’, but have had a significant impact in reality. Although
it is true that some member states, notably Greece, have had difficulties so far to
meet the EU’s new asylum minimum standards, those are increasingly being
implemented in practice as a result of both assistance and pressure from the
EU. Since 2000, the efforts of EU member states to develop and improve
their asylum systems have been supported by a financial solidarity mechanism,
the European Refugee Fund (ERF). This has steadily grown to reach E628
million in its third phase (2008–2013). In addition, it was decided in 2010
to establish the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which aims to
provide further expertise and technical assistance to EU member states in the
field of asylum (Comte 2010). Pressure on non-compliant member states has
also been exercised by the European Commission, which, since 2004, has
launched infringement proceedings against several states for not fully imple-
menting the various EU asylum directives and regulations (Peers 2007: 91).
As a result, these member states have had to amend their national asylum pol-
icies in order to comply with the EU standards. Thus, the analysis of the main
legal instruments adopted by the EU in the asylum venue has shown that,
overall, the switch to the EU policy venue has not led to the adoption of
more restrictive, but rather more generous, legal standards for asylum-seekers
and refugees.
EXPLAINING THE EU ASYLUM POLICY THROUGH CHANGES
TO THE EU ‘SYSTEM OF POLICY VENUES’
As the previous analysis has shown that the switch to the EU policy venue has
not led to an increase, as one would have expected on the basis of Guiraudon’s
(2000) analysis, but rather to a decrease in restrictiveness in asylum legal stan-
dards, it is important to explain this outcome. In line with the amended venue-
shopping framework developed earlier, this article argues that a key-factor
explaining this surprising outcome is the changes that have affected the
‘system of policy venues’ to which the EU asylum policy venue belongs. As pre-
viously argued, any policy venue may be altered as a result of changes that affect
the broader system of venues in which it is located. New political actors with
their own preferences may enter the venue and the preferences of the actors
already present in the venue may evolve as a consequence, which would
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significantly affect the policies subsequently adopted in the venue. It is therefore
crucial to investigate the changes that have affected the EU system of venues
since Guiraudon’s seminal article of 2000.
Recent years have seen significant changes made to the EU system of policy
venues through the entry into force of various treaties, namely the Amsterdam
Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Whilst they affected the whole
EU system of policy venues, these changes have had two important effects on the
EU asylum policy: (1) the strengthening of the role of the EU institutions
(European Commission, European Parliament and ECJ) vis-à-vis that of the
member states in the EU asylum policy venue compared to the initial intergo-
vernmental institutional setting established by the Maastricht Treaty (‘commu-
nitarization’ of asylum); and (2) a significant increase in the importance of
judicial actors and texts (‘judicialization’) in the EU asylum policy venue.
These two developments are inter-related and partially overlapping through
the growing role of the ECJ. Indeed, the increasing communitarization of
asylum has led to the reinforcement of the role of the ECJ, which, in turn,
has contributed to the increasing judicialization of the EU asylum policy
venue. Nevertheless, these two trends are analytically separated in the following
analysis for more clarity.
Changes to the institutional framework: the increasing
communitarization of asylum
There have been significant changes gradually affecting the EU institutional fra-
mework in recent years and some of those have had an important impact on the
EU asylum policy (see notably Niemann 2008). The asylum policy venue exam-
ined by Guiraudon in 2000 had been strongly intergovernmental for the most
part, as the few changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty only came into
force in 1999. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty had established two new ‘intergo-
vernmental pillars’, one for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and the other for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters, which included
asylum issues. With regard to asylum matters (see Article K of the Maastricht
Treaty), member states were largely dominant in the policy-making process.
The European Commission was only ‘fully associated with the work’ in the
area of asylum, whilst the role of the European Parliament was limited to
being informed and consulted on the initiatives of the member states. As for
the ECJ, it was not given any role with respect to EU asylum provisions.
This institutional architecture was significantly changed by the Amsterdam
Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Several of these institutional
changes had an important impact on the EU asylum venue, leading to an
increased ‘communitarization’ of asylum. The role of the European Commis-
sion was reinforced as it received the competence to draft proposals on
various aspects of the EU asylum policy, as has been illustrated in the previous
section. However, during a transitional period of five years, the European Com-
mission was to share its right of initiative with the member states, before
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acquiring the sole right of initiative (Article 73o of the Amsterdam Treaty).
Although this institutional arrangement was aimed as a ‘brake’ on the powers
of the Commission in the legislative process, in practice, the European Commis-
sion managed to push for its more inclusive asylum agenda. It was successful in
significantly influencing the EU asylum provisions adopted during the transi-
tional period by playing the normative role of ‘supranational policy entrepre-
neur’, as demonstrated by Kaunert (2009, 2010). This was notably shown by
the way it managed to largely remain in control of the asylum policy agenda
in the medium term in the face of the British government’s (unsuccessful)
attempt at setting the agenda with its proposal on the extra-territorial processing
of asylum claims (Léonard 2007). During the transitional five-year period, the
Council took decisions unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.
The Amsterdam Treaty also contained a provision granting the Council the
possibility of deciding, after the five-year transition period, that the co-decision
procedure was to apply to various policy issues, including asylum.
The Amsterdam Treaty also gave the ECJ a more prominent role in the EU
asylum policy venue. With regard to asylum matters, the ECJ was granted the
competence to rule, when asked by a national court or tribunal, on two types of
questions: those on the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on asylum and
those on the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity based on the Treaty provisions on asylum, but only in cases ‘pending before
a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law’ (Article 73(p) of the Amsterdam Treaty). Although
the limitations to the role of the ECJ have often been criticized (Peers 2005),
this was nevertheless a significant change, since it led to several cases on
asylum being brought before the Court, as will be further discussed in the
next section on judicialization.
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, has
further strengthened the role of the ECJ and the European Parliament respect-
ively. This has in turn reinforced the liberal character of the EU asylum venue,
which renders the adoption of more restrictive asylum provisions less likely. The
Lisbon Treaty has amended and reorganized existing treaties into two separate
treaties, namely the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The EU legal competences in
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which comprises asylum
matters, have been clarified, as Article 4 (2j) TFEU has categorized this
policy area as one of shared competences. The Treaty of Lisbon has also signifi-
cantly altered the institutional arrangements presiding over the development of
the EU asylum policy. Indeed, it foresees that all asylum legal instruments
should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
which is laid down in Article 294 TFEU. This means that the European Parlia-
ment has now acquired joint decision-making powers on asylum, which rep-
resents a significant increase in power for this institution compared to
previous institutional arrangements, whilst the Council takes decisions by qua-
lified majority voting. In addition, judicial control has been expanded, as the
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Court’s role has been strengthened with respect to the AFSJ, including the EU
asylum policy. In particular, the Court’s preliminary jurisdiction, which used to
be limited, has been expanded and generalized to all AFSJ matters by the Treaty
of Lisbon, with respect to both primary and secondary law. This reform already
resulted in the first preliminary ruling request from a lower court, in Luxem-
bourg, to the Court in March 2010 (Garlick 2010: 60).
Thus, the role of the EU institutions has been greatly strengthened in the
asylum policy area. This analysis of the development of the EU ‘system of
policy venues’ has shown that it has led to an increasing communitarization
of asylum, with growing roles for the European Commission, the European Par-
liament and the ECJ. More ‘refugee-friendly’ than Interior ministers, the
growing presence of these institutions in the EU asylum policy venue has rep-
resented an increasingly important obstacle for those national policy-makers
that are willing to develop more restrictive asylum provisions in the EU. This
strongly contributes to explaining why the main asylum instruments that
have been adopted by the EU have not entailed any lowering of existing
asylum legal standards, but rather their improvement overall.
The increasing judicialization of the EU asylum policy venue
In addition to these institutional changes, another important factor explaining
why the asylum legal standards adopted at the EU level have not turned out to
be as restrictive as anticipated by Guiraudon (2000) is a series of changes that
amount to the increasing ‘judicialization’ of the EU asylum policy venue.
This can be broadly defined as the increasing influence of juridical texts and
actors on asylum policy-making. Amongst those, one can highlight the
gradual strengthening of the role of the ECJ with respect to asylum, which
comes in addition to the indirect, but significant, influence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)1 (Guild 2006b), as well as the inscription
of the Geneva Convention and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
EU treaties.
As previously explained, the ECJ has been given an increasing amount of
competences towards asylum matters, which have led to several cases in
recent years, already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.2 In that
respect, case C-465/07 (Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van
Justitie) – which followed a referral by the Dutch Raad van State and was
related to the Qualification Directive of 2004 – is particularly important. By
clarifying some of the ambiguous provisions contained in the Qualification
Directive regarding the scope of its Article 15(c), it has demonstrated the impor-
tant role that the ECJ has begun and will continue to play in offering less restric-
tive and more generous interpretations of EU legislation than those of some
member states. Subsequent rulings, such as those in case C-31/09 (Nawras
Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal) and joined cases C-57/09
and C-101/09 (Germany v. B and Germany v. D), have confirmed this
general trend. In addition to the other cases on which the ECJ is expected to
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rule in the near future, the role of the ECJ in the EU asylum policy venue has
been reinforced by the introduction in 2008 of a new high-speed preliminary
ruling procedure for references in the AFSJ for cases where an urgent response
is required because of issues of personal freedom (Millett 2008). It can notably
be applied to provisions concerning asylum. As for the ECtHR, it has also
increasingly contributed to the judicialization of the EU asylum policy venue,
as it has ruled more than 45 times on cases concerning asylum since 2005. In
his systematic analysis of the rulings on asylum of the ECtHR (until 2009),
Bossuyt (2010) has demonstrated that the Court has become increasingly criti-
cal of the actions of governments and, concomitantly, more favourably disposed
towards asylum-seekers, especially since 2005 (see also Garlick 2010). The influ-
ence of the ECtHR on the EU asylum policy venue has been indirect, as it is not
an EU institution and the EU is not party to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) either. However, all member states of the EU are
party to the Court, whilst ECJ rulings also make references to the ECHR.
The ECHR and the ECtHR have therefore indirectly contributed to the judi-
cialization of the EU asylum policy venue. The rulings of both these Courts
on asylum have been particularly important because they have also fed into
the EU legislative process. In particular, the European Commission has
drawn upon them to advance its more inclusive agenda in the field of
asylum. This is demonstrated by the fact that all the proposals of the European
Commission for recast instruments on asylum, which are currently under nego-
tiation, include references to the importance of complying with the case law of
the ECtHR, whilst the proposal for a recast Qualification Directive and those
for a recast Reception Conditions Directive also refer to the jurisprudence of
the ECJ. Finally, it is important to highlight that the ECHR and the ECtHR
are set to exercise an even stronger influence on the EU asylum policy in the
future, as the Lisbon Treaty lays down the obligation for the EU to accede to
the ECHR (Article 6 TEU). The EU’s accession to the ECHR, which has
been negotiated since July 2010, will significantly contribute to strengthening
further the judicialization of the EU asylum policy venue.
In addition to the reinforced role of the ECJ with regard to asylum matters
and the indirect influence of the ECtHR, the judicialization of the EU
asylum policy venue is also the result of the growing importance of legal texts
that increasingly constrain policy-makers when adopting EU asylum provisions.
The most important of them are the Geneva Convention and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Article K.2 of the Maastricht Treaty already established
that EU provisions on asylum were to comply with the Geneva Convention
of 28 July 1951, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights. Sub-
sequent EU treaties have emphasized that asylum measures should be adopted
‘in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of
31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties’.
This is an important development because it has strengthened the legal value
of the provisions of the Geneva Convention by introducing them into the
EU’s legal order. A good illustration for this argument is found in the United
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Kingdom, where calls for a British withdrawal from the Geneva Convention
were notably made by the then Home Secretary David Blunkett in 2003 and
the then leader of the opposition Michael Howard in 2005 (Kaunert 2009:
151). While this might have previously been legally possible under international
law, the proponents of such a move had to rapidly acknowledge that this was no
longer the case. The main reason was that, at the time, the United Kingdom had
been ‘opting-in’ to all EU asylum directives (Fletcher 2009), which had been
adopted in accordance with the Geneva Convention. It therefore appeared
that, short of leaving the EU altogether, the United Kingdom would not be
able to withdraw from the Geneva Convention. This case highlights how the
development of EU co-operation on asylum has led to the direct introduction
of the Geneva Convention within the EU legal order, which has strengthened
the legal standing of the Geneva Convention in the EU. In turn, this has signifi-
cantly constrained those policy-makers who are interested in adopting more
restrictive asylum provisions, as Article 33 of the Geneva Convention lays
down a non-refoulement obligation with regard to refugees and asylum-
seekers. Moreover, this trend is set to be further reinforced in the future, as
the recent Stockholm programme (2009) indicates that the EU’s direct acces-
sion to the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol is being considered
(Council of the European Union 2009: 69).
Another important change to the EU political system that has affected the
asylum policy venue – also by making it less restrictive – has been the incorpor-
ation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU’s legal order following
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Article 6(1)
TEU provides a cross-reference to the Charter on Fundamental Rights that
renders the latter directly legally binding for the European institutions,
Union bodies, offices and agencies, as well as member states when they adopt
and implement Union law, including in the field of asylum (except those that
have exceptions to various degrees, such as the UK, Poland, and in principle,
soon the Czech Republic and Ireland). Amongst these fundamental rights,
the ‘right to asylum’ is enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter, ‘which is wider
even than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Peers 2001: 161).
According to Gil-Bazo (2008), this provision concerns all individuals falling
under EU legislation, whose international protection grounds are established
by international human rights law, including the Refugee Convention and
the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 19 of the Charter also
forbids collective expulsions and states that ‘no one may be removed, expelled
or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be sub-
jected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment’. The fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights has now become
legally binding is an important development for the EU political system as a
whole, as it ‘create[s] or expand[s] rights protection in certain important
fields’ and recognizes ‘a number of migration-related “rights” that have not in
the past been recognized as human rights in international instruments, most
notably the right to asylum’ (Peers 2001: 166–7). This development has
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therefore made the EU asylum policy venue more liberal. The impact of the
Charter on the EU asylum policy venue can already be seen in the fact that
all the proposals of the European Commission for recast instruments on
asylum, which have been negotiated since 2008, include numerous references
to the importance of complying with the Charter – not only its Articles 18
and 19, but also other articles that are highly relevant to asylum processes,
such as the rights to liberty and to an effective remedy before a court or a tribu-
nal. Thus, the European Commission is now able to use the text of the Charter
as further ammunition to push for its more inclusive agenda, which aims to
achieve higher legal standards in the field of asylum.
In sum, both the judicialization and the increasing communitarization of the
EU asylum policy venue have rendered it increasingly liberal and less amenable
to the adoption of the restrictive asylum provisions that one would have
expected to observe on the basis of Guiraudon’s (2000) analysis.
CONCLUSION
This article aimed to revisit the influential ‘venue-shopping’ argument originally
made by Guiraudon in 2000. In her article, she had convincingly argued that
national policy-makers had decided to move to the EU asylum policy venue
in order to free themselves from the liberal constraints present in domestic
political contexts and thereby enable themselves to develop more restrictive
policies. On the basis of this argument, one would have therefore expected to
see the subsequent adoption of more restrictive EU asylum measures. This
article has examined the development of the EU asylum policy and has
shown that, actually, the main EU asylum legal instruments have overall ren-
dered asylum standards more liberal, rather than more restrictive, in the EU.
Moreover, this liberal trend is arguably set to continue, as the European
Commission, which has been steadily pushing for more integration and
higher legal standards in the asylum area (Kaunert 2009, 2010), has tabled
‘recast’ versions of the various instruments concerning asylum. Those aim to
further raise asylum standards in the EU and have increased legitimacy
through the numerous references that they contain to the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights and the jurisprudences of the ECJ and the ECtHR. It is important to
emphasize again that this conclusion is limited to the policy developments
within the EU asylum policy venue, since potential co-dependency effects
have not been investigated owing to space restrictions. Such co-dependency
effects from the EU borders policy venue could have restrictive effects – but
only with regard to potential asylum-seekers, not actual asylum-seekers, who
have already applied for asylum.
Furthermore, this article has demonstrated that the development of the EU
asylum policy, and in particular the fact that it has not led to a decrease in
asylum legal standards, can be explained by considering the broader ‘system
of venues’ in which the EU asylum policy venue is embedded. This system of
venues has seen important changes following the adoption of various EU
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treaties. Those have led to an increased communitarization of asylum matters
and a growing judicialization of the EU asylum policy venue, which have ren-
dered this policy venue less amenable to the fulfilment of restrictive asylum pre-
ferences. In effect, member states are now locked into a more liberal system of
policy venues following the ratification of the various EU treaties, including the
Lisbon Treaty most recently. This confirms that there are indeed, as suggested
earlier, some dangers inherent to venue-shopping, which are notably the result
of unanticipated consequences. When those in favour of more restrictive asylum
policies began to co-operate on asylum at the EU level, they could not have
anticipated all the treaty changes that would subsequently affect the EU –
and which would be decided by other actors, such as Heads of State or Govern-
ment and Foreign Affairs ministers – and the considerable impact that these
changes would have on the policy venue to which they had just relocated.
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NOTES
1 Located in Strasbourg, the Court rules on applications alleging violations of the rights
set out in the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.
2 Case C-133/06 (European Parliament v. Council) concerned an action for annul-
ment brought by the European Parliament against the Procedure Directive. Case
C-19/08 (Migrationsverket v. Petrosian) followed a referral by a Swedish Court
and concerned the implementation of two specific provisions of the ‘Dublin II’
Regulation.
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